The authors draw on data from a national random digit dial (RDD) telephone sample of 1,549 adult Americans conducted between October 15, 2001, and March 2, 2002 , to explore the impact of a need for security on support for national security policies in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They examine support for protective government policies among individuals who vary in their ability to feel secure in the aftermath of terrorism, exploring the interaction between perceived threat and felt security. Most Americans reported a sense of security after the 9/11 attacks. But a sense of insecurity among a minority of Americans coupled with a perceived threat of future terrorism increased support for both domestic and international security policy-the curtailment of domestic civil liberties, tougher visa checks, and support for the war in Afghanistan. The authors' findings underscore the diverse ways in which individuals react politically to a common external threat.
Keywords: threat; public opinion; security; attachment theory P sychological reactions to terrorism play a pivotal role in understanding public support for government antiterrorist policies. As Crenshaw (1986, 400) argued, "The political effectiveness of terrorism is importantly determined by the psychological effects of violence on audiences." Psychological reactions to external threat differ, however, and these reactions shape support of government policies designed to combat terrorism. In our past research, we have explored the differing political implications of anxiety, anger, perceived personal threat, and perceived national threat (Huddy et al. 2005; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Huddy et al. 2002 ). In the current study, we take this research one step further to explore not only political
The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity reactions to threat but how a sense of security interacts with threat to influence support for national security policies.
Terrorists aim to threaten members of a target population directly by perpetrating random acts of violence on people engaged in everyday activities. Research on threats that involve the potential for physical harm such as crime, natural disasters, and violent conflicts provides clear evidence that personal threat increases one's sense of vulnerability and motivates action designed to minimize personal risk (Browne and Hoyt 2000; Ferraro 1996; Sattler, Kaiser, and Hittner 2000) . We find similar evidence after 9/11. Individuals living in Queens and Long Island (in relatively close proximity to the World Trade Center) who felt personally threatened by terrorism used more caution in handling their mail, spent more time with their families, delayed or dropped their plans to travel by air, and used public transportation in Manhattan less frequently in the several months after the attacks. In this instance, perceived personal threat motivated cautionary action over and above the effects of any perceived risk of terrorism to Americans more generally (Huddy et al. 2002) .
Threat not only motivates protective behaviors but also promotes support for protective government policies. Studies conducted to date find a clear link between national threat and support for national and domestic security policies (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al. 2005 ). In our research on reactions to 9/11, we find that perceived future terrorist threat leads to greater support for an aggressive national security policy, including increased support for the war in Afghanistan (Huddy et al. 2005) . Threat also heightens support for increased surveillance policies against current and potential Arab immigrants to the United States and policies that promise increased domestic safety but could threaten Americans' civil liberties. National threat leads to support for punitive action against terrorist groups (Bar-Tal and Labin 2001; Gordon and Arian 2001; Friedland and Merari 1985) . And an adversary's degree of belligerence and the level of threat posed to U.S. interests increase public support for war and military action against a specific aggressor (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Mueller 1973) . Threat clearly increases support for aggressive foreign policy. It is less clear, however, whether this reaction serves a retaliatory function or is seen as a form of personal protection.
We further explore the link between threat and support of national security policy by examining the extent to which it depends on a person's degree of felt security. Our research stems from evidence that some individuals are able to maintain a sense of security even in the face of threatening events. This sense of security may undercut their need for protective personal and government policies in response to threatening events (Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2002; Mikulincer and Shaver 2003; Fraley et al. 2006) .
A Need for Security: Attachment and Terror Management Theories
Social scientists broadly agree that a sense of security is a basic need in humans and other species (Fraley 2002; Goldberg 2000; Mikulincer and Shaver 2003) . Psychologist Abraham Maslow (1943) placed security just above the satisfaction of basic physiological needs in his hierarchy of human needs (and below love and self-actualization). And political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1997) , building on Maslow's work, viewed the fulfillment of basic economic and security needs as a necessary societal precondition to the pursuit of postmaterialist values that emphasize freedom, self-expression, and quality of life. Bowlby's attachment theory ([1969] 1982) represents an evolutionary-developmental account of social behavior that posits a need for social proximity to protective others, especially under conditions of threat and danger, to explain the development of felt security. According to this approach, the attachment system-a system that takes shape in early infancy-is activated in times of distress. Successful attachment is built on a foundation of secure parental relations, produces a lifelong ability to positively cope with negative events and their accompanying anxiety and stress, and leads to an enduring sense of security.
Building on Bowlby's notion ([1969] 1982) of a universal human need for attachment as a way to deal with insecurity, numerous scholars have explored the likely evolutionary advantage of adult attachment under conditions of threat (Ainsworth et al. 1978; Mikulincer and Shaver 2003; Fraley, Brumbaugh, and Marks 2005; Kirkpatrick 1998; Tancredy and Fraley 2006; Simpson et al. 2007) . Several different possibilities have been raised. First, adult attachment could improve human reproductive fitness through the process of kin selection by promoting the protection of those with whom one shares similar genes (Hamilton 1964) . Second, adult attachment could be a simple outgrowth of humans' protracted developmental period in infancy in which attachment is needed to protect offspring and stimulate complex social and cognitive skills (Bowlby [1969 (Bowlby [ ] 1982 Fernald 1992; Mikulincer and Shaver 2003; Fraley 2002) . Third, adult attachment may foster long-lasting romantic and parenting relationships that may improve the fitness of one's offspring (Zeifman and Hazan 1997; although for alternative views, see Belsky 1999; Chisholm 1996; Buss and Schmitt 1993; Schmitt 2005; cf. Kirkpatrick 1998) .
The primary goal of attachment behaviors is to reduce anxiety through an established sense of "felt security" (Sroufe and Waters 1977) . The attachment system emerges in early infancy, particularly in the context of the caregiver-child relationship, and operates as a functional system organizing interpersonal beliefs throughout development (Bowlby [1969 (Bowlby [ ] 1982 . While the attachment system is universal, operating in all humans and a host of other organisms (e.g., Fraley, Brumbaugh, and Marks 2005) , individual differences often emerge from variations in attachment histories. Successful early attachment experiences establish one's chronic attachment style, operating as what Bowlby ([1969] 1982) referred to as an "internal working model" of the self and other (Bartholomew and Horowitz 1991) . For instance, a secure attachment style-marked by self-confidence, empathy, and trust between the caregiver and child-stems from repeated episodes of successful attachment behavior. Insecure attachment patterns emerge in less responsive caregiving contexts (Mikulincer and Shaver 2003; Brennan and Shaver 1995; Mikulincer and Shaver 2001) . While many scholars have distinguished between the various types of insecure attachment patterns (e.g., Weber and Federico 2007) , and the stability of attachment patterns throughout development (e.g., Simpson et al. 2007 ), we are primarily concerned with the difference between a secure and insecure attachment as a moderating influence on emotional and political reactions to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Once established, attachment styles are relatively constant across the lifespan, suggesting that they serve as a stable individual difference (Fraley 2002; Ainsworth 1991; Simpson et al. 2007 ) that may be mediated by distinct neural and hormonal reactions to threat. For instance, Kraemer (1992) found that physiological indicators of stress such as norepinephrine varied in rhesus monkeys depending on whether they were reared in isolation or with mothers and/or peers. Humans with an enduring sense of insecurity release higher levels of glucocorticoids in stressful situations than those with a secure attachment (Goldberg 2000) . Moreover, in a major longitudinal study, Simpson et al. (2007) found that one's attachment pattern measured in infancy predicted social competence in adolescence, feelings of security in late adolescence and, ultimately, the ways in which romantic partners related to one another in early adulthood.
A good deal of research on attachment theory has been devoted to the assessment of individual differences in attachment style and the effects of this style on interpersonal relations and mental health. But the theory is broader than that and has been employed to understand individual differences in the development of political ideologies (Weber and Federico 2007) , coping with the 9/11 terrorist attacks , derogating out-groups (Mikulincer and Shaver 2003) , engaging in risk-seeking behavior (Taubman Ben-Ari and Mikulincer 2007) , and responding to stressful events. Typically, researchers examine the impact of attachment style on coping with various threats (for a review, see Mikulincer and Shaver 2003) . Some of that research is very relevant to the study of reactions to terrorism. Mikulincer, Florian, and Weller (1993) examined the effects of the Gulf War and Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israelis with different attachment styles and found that securely attached individuals perceived lower levels of threat, reported higher levels of self-efficacy, actively sought out social support, and pursued constructive problem-solving strategies. Former Israeli prisoners of war with a secure attachment style recalled positive memories or encounters with others to help cope with their imprisonment, in essence seeking symbolic proximity to internalized attachment figures (Solomon et al. 1998) . The need for attachment can also be activated by a mortality salience manipulation typically employed in the study of terror management theory . Secure individuals often react to mortality salience by seeking the closeness of others, whereas attachment insecurity tends to inhibit social interaction and can lead to harsh treatment of those who violate social conventions (Mikulincer and Florian 2000; Taubman Ben-Ari, Findler, and Mikulincer 2002; Florian, Mikulincer, and Hirschberger 2002; Fraley et al. 2006) .
When taken together, research on attachment theory suggests that a longstanding sense of security derived from a secure attachment style and its associated active coping strategies may help to mitigate the negative effects of stressful events. The ability to cope well with stressful events may extend to politics, undermining the need among secure individuals for government policies designed to promote a sense of safety. This possibility has not yet received empirical support but offers an intriguing explanation of how long-standing dispositions interact with events to shape support for government security policies. As a consequence, the theory may help to explain why threat is likely to drive one person to demand more powerful safety and security policies from the federal government while another is able to maintain a sense of personal security in the absence of government action.
The ability to cope well with stressful events may extend to politics, undermining the need among secure individuals for government policies designed to promote a sense of safety.
In a popular competing view of how humans maintain a sense of ongoing security, terror management theorists (Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2002) provide a related but distinct account of how individuals restore a sense of security in the face of threat, especially existential threats linked to one's morality. From this perspective, coping involves adherence to a cultural worldview linked, for example, to religion, moral conduct, or patriotism that boosts self-esteem and often involves the derogation of outsiders who do not share the same view. Terror management researchers have paid less attention to differences in the ways in which individuals restore a sense of security, but recent research by Hart, Shaver, and Goldenberg (2005) suggests that differences in attachment style also moderate responses to existential threats. In their research, insecure individuals were most likely to respond to existential threat with more positive ratings of an in-group member.
In this research, we closely examine whether a sense of felt security provides a buffer against threatening events and reduces the need for government action to maintain a sense of safety. We focus on both domestic and international government security policies. In essence, we test whether perceived threat coupled with a feeling of insecurity promotes support for policies that enhance domestic security but may reduce civil liberties and leads to increased support for overseas military action.
Anxiety: A Needed Control
In turning to security as an important moderating influence on perceived threat, it is important to distinguish its effects from that of anxiety, with which it is related. Our past work demonstrates that personal threat is strongly tied to a sense of heightened anxiety. Individuals who felt anxious after 9/11 experienced higher levels of personal threat and were more likely to live in New York City and to have known someone who was killed or injured in the attacks (Huddy et al. 2005 ). This highlights a key facet of anxiety. It is, in part, situational (Eysenck 1992) . But this stands in marked contrast to a sense of security, which, unlike anxiety, is grounded in a long-standing sense of personal safety that is unlikely to be affected by a specific stressful event. Anxiety is a product of a stressful event whereas a sense of security mitigates negative psychological reactions to such an event (Mikulincer and Shaver 2003) .
Research on attachment theory makes clear that anxiety and a secure attachment style are negatively related. A secure attachment predicts better mental health under stressful circumstances and decreased symptoms of depression and anxiety . A sense of felt security is likely to dampen anxious reactions to the events of 9/11 and so be negatively related to it, but we expect the relationship to be modest because other situational factors such as proximity to the events or the severity of their personal impact also shape a sense of personal threat and concomitant levels of anxiety.
We expect anxiety and security to have differing effects on domestic and national security policies. Recent psychological research demonstrates that threat-induced anxiety tends to elevate risk perceptions and risk aversion (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Lowenstein et al. 2001; Raghunathan and Pham 1999) . The link between anxiety and risk aversion has important implications for support of national but not domestic security policies. Anxiety is likely to elevate the perceived risks associated with a given military intervention and decrease support for the deployment of military troops, potentially undercutting a desire for retaliation. But it is unlikely to undercut support for domestic security policies that are not inherently risky. We have confirmed these predictions in our prior research on reactions to 9/11 and the Iraq war (Huddy et al. 2005; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007) . In contrast, both domestic and international security policies should provide a sense of security to threatened individuals who lack a strong sense of internal safety.
Research on attachment theory makes clear that anxiety and a secure attachment style are negatively related.
Hypotheses
We supplement past findings from research on terrorism with recent psychological insights from attachment and terror-management theories on the importance of felt security in dealing with stressful events. We focus specifically on the degree to which the political effects of threat depend on a sense of insecurity. We contrast the origins of felt security with other reactions to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and expect security to be less influenced by the details of the immediate event than anxiety and depression. Consistent with the predictions of attachment theory, we also expect felt security to moderate the influence of threat on anxiety. We examine whether a sense of security moderates the desire to bolster selfesteem through an increase in American patriotism and heightened denigration of outsiders, consistent with the expectations of a blended attachment-terror management approach.
Finally, we evaluate whether felt security decreases the political effects of perceived threat on support of national security policy. Felt security should also decrease the impact of threat on support for overseas military action. In contrast, insecure individuals who perceive pervasive threat should be most inclined to support both domestic and international security policy. (RDD) telephone numbers was generated by Genesys Inc. from telephone blocks with at least one listed residential number (one-plus). Respondents were selected randomly within the household using the last-birthday method (Lavrakas 1993) . The sample was drawn as a weekly rolling cross-section with roughly one hundred individuals interviewed each week throughout this period. Numbers from each randomly selected sample were in use for a two-week period. The first month of data was collected by Shulman, Ronca, and Bukuvalis; the remainder of the data was collected by the Stony Brook University Center for Survey Research. Up to fifteen callbacks were made at each number and an attempt was made to convert individuals who initially refused. The overall response rate was 32 percent (calculated as American Association of Public Opinion Research [AAPOR] Response Rate 3), and the cooperation rate was 52 percent (AAPOR Cooperation Rate 3; for more details on response rate calculations, see http://www.aapor.org/pdfs/standarddefs_4.pdf).
Methods and Results

Sample
1
Threat and security
We begin by examining the perceived threat of terrorism in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. The survey included four items designed to measure the perceived threat of terrorism, which are presented in Table 1 . Levels of national threat were quite high. More than 85 percent of Americans reported that they were very or somewhat concerned about another attack, and 84 percent were very or somewhat concerned about the threat of biological or chemical attacks. Levels of personal threat were lower, although still surprisingly high given the very small percentage of the population killed in the attacks. More than twothirds (68 percent) of respondents reported being very or somewhat concerned about being personally affected by a terrorist attack; 31 percent were very concerned. More than half (52 percent) said that the attacks had shaken their sense of personal safety and security a great deal or some. This latter item appears to tap security, but in reality it is more closely aligned with perceived personal and national threat. These four items are highly intercorrelated with a mean correlation .48, and a simple additive scale has an estimated reliability (coefficient alpha) of .79. The perceived threat scale ranges from 0 to 1 and has a mean of .66 and standard deviation of .24.
It is clear from these responses that Americans saw considerable future terrorist threat to the nation in the months after 9/11. Despite this, levels of felt security were high. The majority of respondents reported feeling secure and confident when asked to "think about the terrorist attacks and the U.S. response." About 45 percent of respondents said they felt secure and confident "very often," a little over a third said they felt this way "sometimes," and only 16 percent said "not very often" or "never." Thus, even when asked about their feelings in the context of the 9/11 attacks, Americans reported high levels of felt security. The two security items were highly correlated (r = .53) and were combined into a scale ranging from 0 to 1 (high security) with a mean of .75. As noted earlier, security is expected to be distinct from other emotional reactions to the attacks such as anxiety. The two security items were asked in the same battery as four anxiety questions. Respondents were again asked, "As you think about the terrorist attacks and the U.S. response, how often have you felt" anxious, scared, worried, and frightened. These four responses were highly correlated (mean r = .59) and combined into a scale with an estimated reliability of .85. A confirmatory factor analysis of all six emotional reactions (anxiety and security) indicates that a two-factor solution is a much better fit to the data than a singlefactor model. With the inclusion of a methods factor to account for the common response alternatives, the estimated correlation for the latent anxiety and security factors is -.35. It is thus clear that the anxiety and security measures are negatively related but are also empirically distinct.
As can be seen in Figure 1 , security and anxiety also have noticeably different distributions in this sample. Consistent with previous research on secure attachments, a large fraction of the respondents score at the upper end of the security measure. Typically, roughly 75 percent of adults have a secure attachment style when assessed with a standard measure based on questions about romantic relationships (Hazan and Shaver 1987) . The mean of the felt security scale in this study is .75 and the median is .83, indicating that feeling secure is the modal response among respondents. While most data center on the high end of the scale, there is a definite lower tail to the distribution that extends to its lowest reaches (3.5 percent of the respondents obtained a value of 0). In contrast, anxiety is more widely distributed with a mean of .39 and a median of .33. High scores on anxiety are much more common in these data than low scores on security, as can be seen in Figure 1 .
Determinants of anxiety, depression, and security
The nature of security can be seen more clearly when we examine its predictors along with the determinants of anxiety and reported symptoms of depression. To measure feelings of depression, respondents were asked, "In the past week, how depressed have you felt, if at all, about the terrorist attacks and the events since then?" with response options ranging from very to not at all. Similar questions were asked about how much difficulty respondents had in concentrating on their job and sleeping. Responses to these questions had a mean interitem correlation of .58 and were combined into an additive scale ranging from 0 to 1. We estimated two models to assess the respective determinants of anxiety, feelings of depression, and felt security. The first model includes demographic variables (age, education, gender, race/ethnicity), political variables (partisan and ideological identification and authoritarianism), and physical and emotional proximity to the 9/11 attacks (living in the Northeast and knowing someone hurt or killed in the attacks). Perceived threat was added to these equations in a second set of models. Estimates of these regression equations are shown in Table 2 .
At the outset, we expected anxiety and depression to be closely linked to different aspects of the terrorist attacks but did not hold the same expectations of felt security because of its theoretical status as a more enduring and stable individual difference. This expectation is largely supported in Table 2 . Physical proximity to the 9/11 attacks, as indicated by living in the Northeast of the United States, had a significant effect on both anxiety and depression. Knowing someone who was killed in the attacks also increased levels of both variables.
2 In contrast, physical and emotional proximity to the attacks did not decrease feelings of personal security. Indeed, there were few other significant predictors of security. Most notably, women reported feeling less secure than men, older people felt more secure than younger respondents, and blacks felt slightly less secure than whites. Political beliefs and allegiances also influenced anxiety and depression. Republicans felt less anxious and depressed, and authoritarians felt more so. But once again felt security was unrelated to partisanship, political ideology, or authoritarianism.
The relative stability of feelings of security is also suggested by the results of a second set of estimates obtained by adding perceived threat to each of the models in Table 2 . As seen in the table, threat has large effects on anxiety and symptoms of depression. Anxiety in particular rises rapidly with increases in perceived threat. While the effect of threat is significant in the security equation, it is small compared to its coefficients in the other two equations. The effect of threat on security is less than a fourth the size of its effect on anxiety (coefficients can be simply compared because each variable is measured on a 0 to 1 scale). Thus, while anxiety and depression were strongly related to the threat of terrorism, those same threat perceptions only slightly reduced feelings of security. In general, there is much less variation in security across social and political variables than is seen for anxiety or depression, and it has no obvious relationship to variables that convey the impact of physical or social proximity to the attacks and its victims. Overall, threat and demographic factors accounted for 6 percent of the variance in felt security compared to 26 percent of the variance in depression and an impressive 42 percent of variance in anxiety. When taken together, these findings provide suggestive evidence that feelings of security may be a long-standing reaction that is relatively unaffected by ongoing events or standard political attitudes and beliefs, although we do not have conclusive evidence on this point.
Emotional consequences of security
According to attachment theory, one of the key functions of a secure attachment is to promote active coping that helps to deal with stress and mitigate its negative psychological consequences. Thus, among people who perceive themselves to be personally at threat from terrorism, feeling secure should result in lower levels of psychological distress than among the insecure. To test the buffering hypothesis, we estimated a regression model for anxiety and depression that included perceived threat, security, and their interaction along with other standard demographic predictors. As shown in Table 3 , there is a sizable coefficient for both threat and its interaction with security. With threat and security both ranging from 0 to 1, the coefficient for security indicates its effect when security is at its minimum. Its impact is large. Among the least secure, perceived threat produces considerable anxiety and depression. There is also a significant interaction between threat and security. The impact of threat among the most secure can be calculated by adding the coefficient for threat to that of the interaction. This indicates that the psychological impact of threat is reduced substantially among the most secure and is almost halved for depression. These findings lend support to the notion that security minimized the psychological impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
According to a blended terror-management attachment theory approach, threat should produce heightened in-group attachments and increased out-group derogation among insecure individuals as another way in which to restore their sense of security (Hart, Shaver, and Goldenberg 2005) . We examine the extent to which threat, security, and their interaction influence levels of symbolic patriotism and negative stereotyping of Arabs in regression equations presented in Table 3 . In this analysis, symbolic patriotism is a scale made up of two items: pride in being American and good feelings in response to the flag (r = .61). Arab stereotyping is assessed with four items asking how well the words trustworthy, honest, violent, and extremist described most Arabs (mean r = .36, alpha = .7).
As seen in Table 3 , the coefficient for threat and its interaction with security are statistically significant for symbolic patriotism. The coefficient for threat indicates the impact of threat when felt security is at zero. And the impact on patriotism is clearly sizable. Threat produces a substantial increase in symbolic patriotism among insecure individuals but has a much more modest positive effect on patriotism among the most secure. Threat also enhances negative Arab stereotypes, but its interaction with security is not significant. The absence of a significant interaction between threat and security means that perceived threat promotes negative stereotypes of Arabs regardless of felt security. Overall, it appears that insecure individuals respond to the threat of terrorism with enhanced in-group attachment as reflected in higher levels of reported patriotism. But out-group derogation is driven simply by threat. These findings highlight the importance of patriotism and in-group attachments as a way to restore a sense of security in the face of threat. In contrast, out-group derogation may simply reflect the vilification of a threatening out-group that has little to do with a sense of personal security.
Domestic security policies
We now turn to an examination of the effects of threat on support for domestic security policies. The survey included two specific proposals to limit general civil liberties to reduce the threat of terror: requiring national identity cards and NOTE: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in bold are at least twice the size of their standard error. Variables are coded to range from 0 to 1 except for age (in tens of years) and education (in years). White is the excluded category for the race/ethnicity dummy variables.
distribution.
allowing the government to monitor personal phone calls and e-mails of ordinary Americans. We also asked respondents if they were more concerned that the country would fail to enact strong antiterrorism laws or if they were more worried that new laws would restrict civil liberties. Three additional questions focused on activities designed to monitor and restrict the activities of people who might be considered threatening. Questions included whether Arabs and Arab Americans in the United States should be put under special surveillance, support for greater restrictions on visas for foreign students and other visitors to the United States, and whether Arabs should undergo more intensive security checks than visitors from other countries. Probit estimates for the first three domestic security measures are shown in Table 4 , and estimates for the second set of security restrictions are presented in Table 5 . In all equations, we include as predictors threat, security, and the interaction between threat and security, along with demographic controls.
The results in Table 4 show that increasing perceptions of threat predict greater support for both domestic security measures and lesser concern with civil POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PERCEIVED THREAT AND FELT INSECURITY 145 liberties. With the inclusion of an interaction term between threat and security, the coefficient for perceived threat yields its effect when security is 0. In all three equations there are large, significant effects of threat when security is low, indicating that perceived threat has a sizable influence on policy support among the least secure. The interaction term is also substantively large, significant at the .05 level with a one-tailed test, and in the predicted direction for national identity cards and concerns about a failure to enact strong antiterrorism laws. In both instances, the effect of threat on support for domestic security policies decreases as security increases. The size of the interaction term indicates that the effect of threat, while smaller for those high in security, does not fully decline to 0. There is no interaction between security and threat for monitoring phones and e-mails, however. The estimates for that equation indicate that the effect of threat is not reduced by felt security. Among the other independent variables, the most consistent predictors of support for internal security measures are political orientations: conservatives and Republicans are more likely to support these policies than liberals and Democrats, and authoritarianism is associated with greater support. In addition, support for these policies decreases somewhat as education increases. The three policies just examined involve security measures that would directly impact most Americans. The second set of policies assess support for more targeted "threats" to security by focusing on Arabs and other foreign visitors to the United States. The estimates for these equations, shown in Table 5 , are broadly similar to those just discussed, with some significant differences. Notice first that, for all three equations, the interaction between personal threat and security is in the predicted direction, significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test, and substantively large. As before, when security is at its lowest value, the effect of personal threat on support for security policies is large. In two of these cases, surveillance and stricter security checks, the interaction between personal threat and felt security is sufficiently large that personal threat has no impact among those who feel completely secure. Thus, security reduces the effects of threat on support for these targeted policies to a greater degree than for more general domestic surveillance policies.
As an illustration of the magnitude of the political effects of threat, we present predicted probabilities at differing levels of threat and security for two of the domestic security policies-the national ID card and special surveillance for Arabs and Arab Americans. Predicted probabilities are calculated for white males who score at the midpoint on all other independent variables in Tables 4 and 5 . Among those scoring at the lowest level of felt security, less than 20 percent are predicted to support national ID cards at the lowest level of perceived threat; this goes up to almost 80 percent among those who see maximum threat. This is a massive difference. The effects of threat are more muted among those high in security, ranging from a predicted low of 38 percent when threat is low to 64 percent when it is high. A similar trend is observed on support for increased surveillance of Arabs and Arab Americans. Among those low in security, predicted support for increased surveillance goes from a low of 9 percent to a high of 58 percent as threat ranges from its lowest to highest value. Among those high in security, predicted support for surveillance varies less dramatically with level of threat, ranging from 26 to 37 percent. It is also clear that those with a high sense of felt security who see little terrorist threat are more supportive of security policies than their less secure counterparts, a somewhat puzzling finding that requires further investigation.
Threat and support for military action
We also examined the impact of threat and security on support for overseas military action in response to the events of 9/11. Three questions tapped support for military intervention in Afghanistan, the general level of U.S. military action in response to the terrorist attacks, support for "increasing the level of military action even if it means that U.S. armed forces might suffer a substantial number of casualties," and whether "the U.S. should limit its military action to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban or should it broaden its action to include other countries that harbor and support terrorists." Ordered probit analyses were conducted to assess the determinants of support for each one of these questions; findings are reported in Table 6 . Previous analyses of these data provide evidence that threat has a substantial, positive impact on support for overseas military action (Huddy et al. 2005 ). This finding is confirmed in the current analysis but is further qualified by evidence of a sizable interaction between threat and security. As seen in Table 6 , threat has substantial impact on all three indicators of support for military action when security is at its lowest level. In addition, the interaction between threat and security is sizable and significant for level of military action and a desire to expand action beyond Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. In both instances, the effects of threat on support for military action are greatly reduced among the most secure. There is also a sizable but nonsignificant interaction between threat and security that almost halves the impact of threat on support for increased military action even with casualties among the most secure.
As for domestic policy, felt security has a sizable moderating influence on the degree to which threat increases support for national security policy. Based on the analyses presented in Table 6 , we calculated the predicted probability that respondents rated the U.S. level of military action in response to 9/11 as "too little." Among those who felt insecure, roughly 6 percent who perceived little threat Finally, a number of other factors influenced support for an aggressive foreign policy. Men, nonblacks, Republicans, conservatives, and authoritarians were generally more supportive of overseas military intervention than others, as seen in Table 6 .
Conclusion
Not everyone responds to the threat of terrorism in the same way. In this study, we have highlighted the powerful moderating influence of felt security on the extent to which perceived threat leads to support for restrictive domestic security policy and aggressive international action. We have shown in past research that feelings of threat promote support for an aggressive foreign policy (Huddy et al. 2005) . The current findings temper that conclusion by demonstrating that the greatest impact of threat is concentrated among individuals who had difficulty maintaining a sense of security in the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. We also highlight the powerful influence of security and threat on support for domestic national security policies that potentially curtail American civil liberties. For both domestic and international security policy, feeling insecure can profoundly influence whether individuals turn to government policy to restore a sense of personal security.
For both domestic and international security policy, feeling insecure can profoundly influence whether individuals turn to government policy to restore a sense of personal security.
by demonstrating the powerful and distinct effects of threat. Past tolerance studies have typically found a strong desire to curtail the rights and liberties of members of groups that pose a broad societal threat (Marcus et al. 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982) . But researchers have paid much less attention to the willingness of study participants to forgo their own liberties and freedoms. Findings from the current study suggest that this depends centrally on the combined experience of threat and insecurity. In our data, a sense of personal insecurity plays a central role in a willingness to forfeit personal liberties in response to an external threat, suggesting new avenues for research on political tolerance. Drawing on psychological attachment theory, we suggest that feelings of security are a long-standing individual characteristic that may derive from early childhood attachment experiences. Attachment theory indicates that most adults achieve a secure attachment, and this, in turn, improves their ability to deal with stress through imagined or real proximity to attachment figures. But more is needed to establish the links between felt security as measured in a survey context and standard measures of attachment in order to verify that felt security has many of the same properties. We uncover suggestive evidence consistent with attachment theory that felt security was not greatly affected by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and was much less affected than other reactions such as anxiety or depression. Felt security helped to minimize feelings of anxiety and mitigated the need to elevate feelings of symbolic patriotism as a way to cope with threat. When taken together, these findings suggest that felt security plays a central role in how people cope with stressful events and whether this translates into support for protective government policies.
But more information is needed on a sense of felt security to ensure that it fully conforms to the expectations of attachment theory. How well does a sense of felt security correlate with other, more standard measures of attachment style within romantic relationships? What evidence is there that a sense of felt security is stable over time and relatively immune to the impact of ongoing events? And is there evidence that the impact of felt security can be observed in response to other government policies designed to handle frightening events such as avian flu or food contamination? Further research into felt security will help to determine the kinds of individuals most likely to support aggressive government action to deal with threatening events. Notes 1. There was no difference in response rate between the two survey organizations, and response rates were similar to those obtained in recent random digit dial (RDD) surveys using a different sampling frame but similar methodology (Steeh et al. 2001; Losch et al. 2002) .
2. The exact question wording is, "Do you, any of your friends, or relatives know someone who is missing, hurt, or killed in the terrorist attacks of September 11?" 3. In additional analyses not reported here, we also find, consistent with the predictions of attachment theory, that felt security is a significant predictor of how much people trust other Americans.
